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McLeod, Mike, and Josh Parsons. “Maclaurin and Dyke on Analytic Metaphysics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 1 (March 2013): 173–78. doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.730534.

Miller, Dale E. “Axiological Actualism and the Converse Intuition.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 1 (2003): 123–25. doi:10.1093/ajp/jag111.

Parsons, Josh. “A Phenomenological Argument for Stage Theory.” Analysis 75, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 237–42. doi:10.1093/analys/anv022.

———. “A-Theory for B-Theorists.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 206 (January 1, 2002): 1–20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543006.

———. “Against Advanced Modalizing.” In Rationis Defensor, edited by James Maclaurin, 139–53. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012.

———. “An Extensionalists’s Guide to Non-Extensional Mereology.,” 2013. http://www.joshparsons.net/draft/nem3/.

———. “Are There Irreducibly Relational Facts?” In Truth and Truth-Making, edited by E.J. Lowe and A. Rami, 217–26. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing, 2008.

———. “Assessment-Contextual Indexicals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 1 (2009): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00048400903493530.

———. “Axiological Actualism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 2 (2002): 137–47. doi:10.1093/ajp/80.2.137.

———. “A–theory for Tense Logicians.” Analysis 63, no. 277 (2003): 4–6. doi:10.1111/j.0003-2638.2003.00386.x.

———. “Cognitivism About Imperatives.” Analysis 72, no. 1 (1, 2012): 49–54. doi:10.1093/analys/anr132.

———. “Command and Consequence.” Philosophical Studies 164, no. 1 (2013): 61–92. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0094-x.

———. “Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition.” Inquiry 56, no. 4 (2013): 327–39. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2013.816249.

———. “Dion, Theon, and Daup.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2004): 85–91. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00188.x.

———. “Distributional Properties.” In Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, edited by Frank Jackson and Graham Priest, 173–80. Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. “Hudson on Location.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, no. 2 (2008): 427–35. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00143.x.

———. “I Am Not Now, nor Have I Ever Been, a Turnip.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 1 (2005): 1–14. doi:10.1080/00048400500043894.

———. “Is a Metaphysical Theory of Truthmakers Possible?,” 2015. http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp2060/draft/tm-incons/.

———. “Is Everything a World.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 134, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 165–81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208713.

———. “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” The Monist 83, no. 3 (2000): 399–418.

———. “Negative Truths from Positive Facts?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4 (2006): 591–602. doi:10.1080/00048400601079144.

———. “Presupposition, Disagreement, and Predicates of Taste.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2013): 163–73. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00350.x.

———. “The Earth and the Aleph,” 2013. http://www.joshparsons.net/draft/aleph/.

———. “The Eleatic Hangover Cure.” Analysis 64, no. 284 (2004): 364–66. doi:10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00512.x.

———. “The Many Primitives of Mereology.” In Mereology and Location, edited by Shieva Kleinschmidt. Oxford University Press, 2014.

———. “Theories of Location.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3 (2007): 201–32. http://otago.academia.edu/JoshParsons/Papers/1015465/Theories_of_Location.

———. “Theories of Persistence.” PhD, Australian National University, 2001.

———. “There Is No ‘truthmaker’ Argument against Nominalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 3 (September 1999): 325–34. doi:10.1080/00048409912349081.

———. “Topological Drinking Problems.” Analysis 66, no. 290 (2006): 149–54. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00603.x.

———. “Truthmakers, the Past, and the Future.” In Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd, 161–74. Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

———. “Why the Handicapped Child Case Is Hard.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 112, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): 147–62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321334.